CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT IN WEST AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA, GHANA, AND SOUTH AFRICA

Abstract

In a democratic society, the legislature is empowered with the responsibility of checking and balancing the actions of the government. This system ensures that public funds are spent expeditiously and that the laws and policies made in a state are duly obeyed. This article undertakes an analytical constitutional comparison of legislative oversight in Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa. These three countries reflect African democracy, whose fundamental designs represent separate approaches to the pattern and enforcement of legislative scrutiny. Referencing constitutional texts, judicial precedents, and academic opinions, this article examines how the fundamental design of oversight powers, committee systems, enforcement authority, enforcement mechanisms, and administrative independence influence the functional value of statutory accountability in Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa. The analysis reveals that while all three constitutions vest notable oversight powers in their legislatures, the existence of these powers has not translated into consistent responsibility in practice. This is shaped by political culture, administrative capability, and judicial attitudes toward enforcing constitutional limitations. The article argues that for effective oversight, what is required is not only strong constitutional provisions but also autonomous institutional infrastructure, clear and accessible procedures, mandatory sanctions, and enforceable punitive measures for non-compliance by the executive. These comparative insights offer actionable guidance for reforming legislative oversight, as the lessons drawn are pertinent to Nigeria, where political and administrative deficits have consistently constrained effective scrutiny at both the federal and state levels.